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Abstract— With the growth of adversarial attacks against
machine learning models, several concerns have emerged about
potential vulnerabilities in designing deep neural network-based
intrusion detection systems (IDS). In this paper, we study the
resilience of deep learning-based intrusion detection systems
against adversarial attacks. We apply the min-max (or saddle-
point) approach to train intrusion detection systems against
adversarial attack samples in NSW-NB 15 dataset. We have the
max approach for generating adversarial samples that achieves
maximum loss and attack deep neural networks. On the other
side, we utilize the existing min approach [2] [9] as a defense
strategy to optimize intrusion detection systems that minimize
the loss of the incorporated adversarial samples during the
adversarial training. We study and measure the effectiveness
of the adversarial attack methods as well as the resistance
of the adversarially trained models against such attacks. We
find that the adversarial attack methods that were designed in
binary domains can be used in continuous domains and exhibit
different misclassification levels. We finally show that principal
component analysis (PCA) based feature reduction can boost
the robustness in intrusion detection system (IDS) using a deep
neural network (DNN).
Keywords: Deep Learning-based Intrusion Detection, ad-
versarial samples, adversarial learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Security applications of deep neural networks (DNNs)
like Intrusion Detection System (IDS), malware detection,
spam-filtering have become essentials in designing tasks for
data protection, classification, and prediction. These different
type of tasks are relying on the intelligence to build a model
that typically classify and discriminate between ”benign”
and ”malign” samples, like attack and benign packets. With
the rapid increase of using DNNs and the vulnerability of
DNNs to adversarial attacks, the sophistication of attack tech-
niques tools is also increased. Therefore, various researches
[16][7] find that different attacks add severe challenges to
vulnerabilities of DNN architecture design. The fact that the
training of DNNs is based on data, the classification task
can be manipulated by crafted, and perturbation inputs called
adversarial samples. Adversaries samples are often visually
imperceptible, and they are designed to reliably mislead
a machine learning model toward incorrect classification
and evade detection [15]. Toward covering the issue of
securing classifiers against adversarial attacks, we study the
adversarial attacks against DNNs and their robustness. In this
paper, our primary goal is to develop a deep learning-based
IDS defender model that can demonstrate robustness against
different adversarial attacks that prove their effectiveness in
different classification domains, including image and mal-
ware classifiers.
In this paper, we focus on the following:
1) Utilizing existing methods that use saddle-point for-
mulation and adversarial training as a defense strategy
to optimize an existing intrusion detection system
framework [2] that can robustly handle adversarial
attacks and reduce false negative (FN) rates and thus
increase model robustness. We train the optimized
network models using NSW-NB 15 data.
2) Analyzing four existing methods [2] to generate adver-
sarial samples including Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) and Fast Gradient Simple Method (FGSM)
across DNNs. We aim to investigate if different ad-
versarial attacks including Multi-Step Bit Gradient As-
cent (BGAS) and Bit Coordinate Ascent (BCAS) [2]
which are designed for discrete domain can generate
adversarial samples in continuous domain. We observe
that BGA adversarial samples have the highest evasion
rate among all other adversaries.
3) Conducting two sets of experiments with different
approaches in pre-processing NSW-NB 15 dataset and
structuring the DNNs detection models. We apply Prin-
cipal Component Analysis (PCA) based dimensionality
reduction on the NSW-NB 15 dataset to attempt lower
evasion attack rates.
4) We select DNNs to develop our IDS model, experimen-
tal models, using Pytorch [2]. We also compare several
existing machine learning algorithms including Neural
Network (NN), Random forest (RF), AdaBoost, Naive
Bayesian (NB), and SVM for classifying network
traffic. The experiment result shows that NN has a
reasonable detection accuracy compared to the other
approaches.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. In
Section II, we begin a brief background about neural net-
works and deep learning, followed by a detailed overview
of adversarial attack methods and adversarial deep learning.
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In Section III, we survey some related work. In Section IV,
we explorer our experiments and methodology, starting by
describing the dataset and how we preprocess it following
with our IDS prototype. In section V, we include the IDS
algorithm and the actual experiments. In Section VI, we
present and evaluate our experimental results started by our
evaluation metrics and ended by our discussion. Finally, in
Section VII, we summarize and present some recommenda-
tions on how we can strengthen our work in future research.
II. BACKGROUND
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a key component
in network systems to monitor and analyze real-time net-
work activities for any symptoms of suspicious, anomalous
activities and issue alerts when such types of activities are
discovered. One of the significant limitations of the standard
intrusion detection systems (IDS) is the urgency to filter and
reduce false alarms[7]. Toward this direction, a majority of
IDSs enhance their capabilities by using neural networks
(NN) towards deep learning. As a solution, Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) based IDS solutions have been developed
to make better learning and processing for big data and
variety of attacks for future prediction.
A. Neural Networks and Deep Learning
Most deep learning models are structured based on Neural
Networks with multiple hidden layers. This called Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs). DNN efficiency is related to
dataset size and requires massive computing power. Using
GPUs for training with DNN models accelerate the learning
process. The DNN architecture is made by many neurons
that are connected to other neurons. Each neuron connection
is associated with weight to multiply it with input variables
(feature) by the non-linear activation function ϕ(x). The acti-
vation function maps the output of neuron values depending
on the function. In our paper, the activation function ϕ for
the output is LogSoftMax and ReLU for the three hidden
layers. To compare how far the prediction result from the
target value y ∈ Y and to achieve an optimal model, we
use a loss (or cost) function T (∅, x, y) [16]. The network
neurons keep adjusting the values of their parameters until
achieving close prediction to reduce error [2].
B. Adversarial Deep Learning
It is increasingly important to guarantee the protection
and robustness against adversarial manipulation. Adversaries
can evade classifiers by adding a calculated perturbation γ
to legitimate samples x ∈ Z(x) to create a new version
x∗ ∈ Z∗(x) called ”Adversarial Sample” , where Z∗(x) ⊆
Z(x), Z is a set of allowed perturbations and Z∗ is a set
of adversarial samples that takes into consideration the max
norm perturbations. In our work with continuous space, we
focus on L∞ to gives the max value of the parameters among
each element samples: ||x||∞= maxi|xi|.
1) Adversarial Learning:
To increase trained model robustness against adversarial
samples, we use the adversarial learning defender strategy
against adversarial attacks that incorporating adversarial sam-
ples in the training phase. Our learned IDS model can be
manipulated by adversaries γ that maximize the loss T to
classify attack samples as benign samples.
We combined in (II-B.1) [2] between the adversarial
crafted formulation (the inner maximization problem); that
aim to find an adversarial sample x∗ from original sample
x that achieves a high loss; and the defender DNN model
(the outer minimization problem ); that aim to minimize the
adversarial loss and increase model robustness. This combi-
nation is the use of min-max (or saddle-point) formulation
[11][2]. The use of this formulation allows us to achieve high
robustness against adversarial attacks.
∅∗ ∈ argmin
∅∈Θ
T (∅, x, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
outer minimization
[
inner maximization︷ ︸︸ ︷
max
x∗∈Z
T (∅, x∗, y)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
adv learning
(II-B.1)
Strategies for creating and designing adversarial attacks
are affected by different limitations. The capability of at-
tacker relays on how attacker controls the input data and
the ability in manipulating the data [3][4]. Following section
focuses on adversarial attack methods and how to generate
adversarial samples.
C. Adversaries Attack Methods
1) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): It is about
updating the gradient of the loss function T along with
its sign direction in one step. The ∇ is used to calculate
the derivative of the loss function. The derivative value of
T (∅, x, y) is used to find the slope of the function at a
given point to adjust the values of the parameters whether
by increasing or decreasing them. This adjustment is a small
value ρ that makes the perturbation not distinguishable.
2) FGSMS with Multiple Step [10]: It is a way to apply
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) multiple times with a
small step size.
Prior works [2] [8] make use of two approaches in
gradient-based methods (e.g update weights in DNN and
crafting adversarial samples):
Randomize Rounding Approach (rFGSMS) is used to
find optimal solution in fraction problem. It’s called lin-
ear programming randomize rounding that gives preci-
sion integer result on each round. Deterministic Approach
(dFGSMS) can be used for both continuous and dis-
crete linear optimization problems [14] make the outcome
deterministic. This approach depends on the attacker level
of knowledge about the classifier [9]. In this work, we use
dFGSMS that uses Deterministic approach and rFGSMS
that uses randomize rounding approach to craft our adver-
sarial samples x∗.
3) Multi-Step Bit Gradient Ascent (BGAS): In the con-
tinuous domain, the use of multiple iterations like dFGSMS
and rFGSMS can generate only a single adversarial sample.
We use the gradient to generate multiple adversarial samples
and select the sample that gives the maximum loss using `2
norm. In our work, we apply this method to our continuous
features, and we use the `2 norm to find the shortest distance
from one point to another.
4) Bit Coordinate Ascent (BCAS): In [2], the authors
used this attack approach to update one bit each iteration that
has a higher partial derivative of the loss. We use a similar
approach to update our one continuous feature a time that
achieve higher partial derivative of the loss compared to the
other features.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Researchers perform various studies of adversarial attacks
with their countermeasures and how they can easily de-
ceive machine learning systems. In [2], authors presented
different adversarial attacks methods to generate an adver-
sarial example of binary malware file that preserves its
functionality. They present a framework for training robust
malware detection models by utilizing the saddle-point for-
mulation that consists of the inner maximization and outer
minimization problems. Their experiment result shows that
rFGSM adversarial trained model has the lowest evasion
rate and higher accuracy among all adversarial attacks. They
used the Portable Executable (PE) files as a dataset created
from VirusShare. BCA and BGA attacks have relatively low
evasion rates comparing to the FGSM attacks. However, the
BCA model has a high evasion rate among all adversaries
attack, which indicates the lowest robustness comparing to
other models.
In Mardy et al. [11] research, they studied the adversarial
robustness of neural networks to guarantee security and be
resistant to a broad class of attacks by using min-max (or
saddle-point) formulation. Their study allows them to cast
both attack and defense. They trained networks on MNIST
and CIFAR10 models based on the saddle-point formulation
and uses their optimal first-order adversary to be robust to a
broad range of adversarial attacks. MNIST model accuracy
against adversarial attack achieves 89%, and CIFAR10 model
achieves 46% accuracy of the same attacks. They found that
CIFAR10 has low accuracy.
While in [16], the authors studied the vulnerabilities of
deep learning-based IDS among adversarial attacks by eval-
uating the effectiveness of state-of-the-art attack algorithms
using NSL-KDD dataset. They compare different adversarial
attacks. Their experiments result shows that CW attacks
have the lowest effectiveness. Also, the use of adversarial
samples targeting specific model can fool another model.
This adversarial property called transferability.
There are fewer works about utilizing min-max formula-
tion and deep learning techniques to design optimal intrusion
detection system that can robustly handle different types of
adversarial attacks. In this paper, we built an experimental
prototype and testbed based on the existing techniques [2]
[11] that incorporates crafted adversarial samples during the
training process and successfully achieve robustness against
the adversarial attack methods.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Dataset and Data Preprocessing
All experiments described in this work are performed
using UNSW-NB 15 dataset [12]. UNSW-NB 15 dataset is
a raw network flow that is created by the IXIA perfecStorm
tool in a lab that generate normal activities and attack
behaviors. Each row in the dataset has 49 features including
the class label. In our experiments, we use 82,332 records
and split it into ”Attack set” and Benign set” including
45,332 attack samples and 37,000 benign samples. The
Attack set has 27,198 training samples and 181,34 samples
between test and validation samples. For the Benign set, it
has 22,200 training samples and 14,800 samples between test
and validation samples.
For preprocessing UNSW-NB 15 dataset, we use the open
source project Orange Data Mining version 3.20 [5] with
its widgets to preprocess the dataset. We select ”Feature
Selection” to assess the usefulness of our features. Based on
the feature rank (or score), we select the best 28 features.
Also, we apply ”Normalization” to change the values of
the numeric features that have a different range to increase
classifier performance and accuracy. Moreover, we prepro-
cess the dataset by using Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [13] to reduce the high dimension of the dataset while
making sure not to lose the necessary information during
reduction and keep variation. We use PCA in the second set
of experiments.
B. Architecture Characteristics and Learning Setup
The DNNs architecture is constructed with three hidden
layers of 300 neurons in layer 1, 100 neurons in layer 2, and
40 neurons for layer 3. We applied two activation functions,
ReLU [1], to the three hidden layers and LogSoftMax to the
output layer to respond to the benign and attack output labels.
We use the open-source machine learning library PyTorch to
implement our five models, and we performed our exper-
iments using the free Jupyter notebook cloud environment
called ’Colaboratory’ with GPU acceleration [6].
The optimized model classifier C is trained using 45,332
attack samples and 37,000 benign samples. We use ADAM as
an optimizer algorithm to adjust the classifier C parameters
∅∗ based on (II-B.1). The DNNs training without evasion
attack achieves 94.1% accuracy on the ”benign dataset”
and 81.6% accuracy for the ”attack dataset.” The inner
maximization was set up to run s=50 iterations.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In our paper, we assume our adversarial attacks are white-
box evasion attacks. They attack the optimized IDS model
during the test time to misclassify the positive ”attack”
sample as a negative ”benign” sample.
We design Algorithm I based on the existing works [2]
to craft adversarial samples using the ”inner maximization”
Fig. 1: IDS prototype Architecture with the inner-maximizer that generate adversarial samples and the outer-minimizer that
reduce False Negative (FN) rates and increase robustness
that generate adversarial samples and maximize the loss
rate T . The deep learning-based IDS defender solution is
illustrated in Figure 1, where the attack set and benign set
are split into three sets (training, validation, and test). Also
it shows how the attack set passes the inner maximizer to
generate adversarial samples and then incorporate them in the
learning phase as well. We train four models using the crafted
adversarial samples generated by dFGSM, rFGSM,BGA, and
BCA attack methods using the ”inner maximization.” We
inject the adversarial samples into the training dataset to
increase the model robustness.
We conducted two sets of experiments to evaluate the
effectiveness of the four evasion attacks and the robustness
of the IDS platform. The details of each experiment are
described below.
Algorithm Selection: To do so, we first built five models
(or binary classifiers) with different machine learning algo-
rithms as shown in Table I including Neural Network (NN)
and trained them by our preprocessed and clean ”UNSW-
NB 15” dataset. The result of the experiments shows that
NN has a reasonable detection of 92% accuracy, 92% Recall
(or FPR), and also 92% Precision (or FNR) to develop our
deep learning-based IDS.
A. Experiments I
In the first set of experiments I, our objective is to identify
the most robust training model to adversarial samples for our
IDS prototype. Thus, we extracted 28 attributes (features)
from our preprocessed dataset to train our IDS prototype.
Then, we load the Attack and Benign sets after splitting them
into training, validation, and test samples. In experiment I,
we set up the hyper-parameters as following: batch size=
100 sample, learning rate ρ = 0.01, evasion rate=50, and
100 epochs. We build five adversarial models including the
Natural model.
1) Natural Model: First, we build our first model naturally
using the non-crafted Attack (clean) samples and non-crafted
Benign samples. We achieve 94.1% for benign accuracy and
81.6% for attack accuracy with 87.85% for overall accuracy.
We also evaluate the robustness of the ”Natural” model
against the four adversarial evasion attacks.
2) Adversarial Models: Second, we trained four models
using the outer minimization algorithms against all adversar-
ial samples generated by the inner maximization. Afterward,
we evaluate each model robustness against all adversarial
attack samples and clean sets.
B. Experiments II
In the second set of experiments, we use the same UNSW-
NB 15 dataset [12]. However, this experiment starts by
preprocessing and transforming the dataset differently using
PCA before we load it to our DNNs. Figure 2 shows that
TABLE I: Performance statistics for UNSW-NB 15 dataset
using different machine learning algorithms
Method Accuracy AUC Precision Recall
NN 92 98 92 92
Random Forest 94 98 94 94
AdaBoost 94 98 94 94
Naive Bayes 73 84 75 73
Constant 55 50 30 55
SVM 45 46 46 45
Algorithm 1 Experimental process based on [2]
1: Input: Attack and Benign training set from D
2: Output: Adversarial trained model, x∗ adversaries
3: Load attack and benign data (train, test & validation)
4: Extract features x =
{
x1,x2,...,xn
}
5: Construct DNN model C
6: Define loss function T using ”ADAM”
7: Define inner-maximization M
8: Batch← 100
9: repeat
10: Read Batch of samples
11: if Evasion method != Natural then
12: Batch∗ ←M(Attack Batch, T,Evasion)
13: start Adversarial Learning (Batch∗)
14: do Test(Batch∗)
15: else Evasion method == Natural
16: start train (Batch)
17: do Test (Batch)
18: end if
19: until epoch=100 and C network converge
20: procedure INNER-MAXIMIZATION(x,y,T,s,method)
21: Computer natural loss for original samples
22: Initialize starting point
23: Compute natural loss for original samples
24: Compute gradient for the loss T
25: Compute the new adversarial sample
26: end procedure
the 16 obtained principal components are covering 95%
variation. This introduced DNNs architecture still has three
hidden layers, but all three layers have 200 neurons. The
hyper-parameters of experiment II for learning rate, epoch
size, batch size, and evasion rate are 0.001, 150, 8, and 50, re-
spectively. The reason behind introducing a new optimization
DNNs architecture using PCA is to investigate if applying
PCA will reduce the evasion rate of the studied adversarial at-
tacks and enhance the adversarial trained models robustness.
Therefore, we generate adversarial samples using the four
adversarial attack methods generated by the inner maximizer.
Also, we built five models, including a Natural model and the
four adversarial training models that are trained with crafted
adversarial samples.
VI. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
This section evaluates the IDS prototype that we imple-
ment using DNNs architecture.
Before diving into the results and evaluation, we want
to present the measurement metrics we use to evaluate the
results. We measure our experiment performance based on
the classification Accuracy (AC), Evasion rate(ER), and Cov-
ering Number (CN). Evasion Rate or False Negative Ratio
(FNR) is the ratio of a total number of crafted samples that
are classified as benign samples among total attack samples.
Covering Number (CN) is a measurement [2] to asses the
inner maximizer algorithm’s ability to create adversarial
samples. CN is the ratio of the total number of adversarial
Fig. 2: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) figure selecting
16 principal components with 95% variance
TABLE II: Evasion Rate Results of Experiment I. The
model column indicates the trained models by the outer
minimizer. The adversarial attack methods row indicates the
methods used that generate adversarial samples by the inner
maximizer
- Adversarial Attack Methods
Model dFGSM rFGSM BGA BCA
Natural 100 99.9 99.9 64.4
dFGSM 17.5 18 15.7 23
rFGSM 23.3 19.1 28.6 23.0
BGA 21.3 22.6 21.8 22.6
BCA 21.5 18.9 24.2 21.6
attack samples generated among the original samples in
the training epochs. Therefore, high CN indicates a high
robustness model [2]. The CN is computed and updated in
each training epoch.
A. Results of Experiment I
We evaluate the effectiveness of the adversarial samples
and the robustness of the defender trained models against
the crafted adversarial samples. Table II summarizes the
results of Experiment I for the five trained models, including
the Natural model and the four adversaries attack methods.
The result values in this Table II are the evasion rate of
the adversarial attacks using the perturbation attack set. We
observe the following: The evasion rates for the ”Natural”
training are high [64.4% - 100%] compared to the other
adversarial training models. This result is expected because
the ”Natural” training model is not trained by any adversarial
samples and only trained by a clean dataset. As we can
see, the Natural training method results demonstrate the
effectiveness of the evasion attacks that induce significant
changes inaccuracy. The evasion rate reaches 100% with 0%
TABLE III: Evaluation Metrics including Overall Accuracy,
Evasion rate of models with regard to the corresponding
adversary (FNR), FPR and the Cover Number (CN)) rate
for Experiment I
Model Accuracy FPR Evasion Rate/FNR CN
Natural 87.2 5.9 18.4 1.0
dFGSM 87.4 6.6 17.5 1.3
rFGSM 87.1 5.4 19.1 7.9
BGA 86.3 3.7 21.8 2.7
BCA 86.4 3.9 21.6 1.2
accuracy against dFGSMs adversaries samples. We observe
a decrease in the evasion rate with BCAs attack against the
Natural training model from 100% to 64.6%. This shows
that BCAs confidence is reduced compared to the other
adversarial training models. The most robust models against
the adversaries are shaded in blue in Table II. While the ones
shaded in gray are the most powerful attacks. We can see
from Table II that dFGSMs model has relatively the lowest
evasion rates 17.5, 18, 15.7 and 23 for dFGSMs,rFGSMs,
BGAs and BCAs respectively across all adversarial attacks
especially against BGAs. The BGAs evasion rate achieves
the lowest 15.7 as shown in Table II. However, we can see in
Table II that BGAs adversarial attack method outperforms
other adversarial attack methods with evasion rate of 28%
against rFGSMs model.
In general, we note as we expect that all training methods
are relatively robust to adversaries from the same methods.
However, we notice that some models are more robust to
other adversaries. For example, dFGSMs model has 15.7%
evasion rate for BGAs while the evasion rate for same
dFGSMs attack method is high 17.5% comparing to 15.7%
evasion rate for BGAs.
We see in Table III that dFGSMs has the lowest
FNR=17.5% comparing to rFGSMs, BGAs and BCAs.
This result corresponds to our finding in Table II that
dFGSMs has the lowest evasion rate across all adversarial
attack methods. While BGAs and BGAs models FNR rates
are 21.8% and 21.6%, respectively. This considers the highest
rate compared to the other models.
Moreover, we computed the Covering Number (CN) rate
for all training models, as shown in Table III against the
same attack method to measure the ratio of a total number
of crafted samples to the total original attack samples in
each epoch. The main objective of CN metric computation
is to observe which adversarial attack method can cover more
adversarial samples. Table III in the yellow shaded cell shows
that rFGSMs attack method has a higher CN ratio of 7.9.
This high rate of CN means that the rFGSMs attack method
explored almost eight times more attack samples compared to
the CN of the Natural model with CN=1. Adversarial attack
method with high CN explored more adversarial samples
during training time, which leads to a more robust model.
In conclusion, we notice relatively that dFGSMs is the
most robust model in experiment I and BGAs is the most
successful evasion attack.
B. Results of Experiment II using PCA
In this experiment, we build a second DNN model with
different architecture, and we preprocess the UNSW-NB 15
set using PCA. The objective is to improve the resilience of
the IDS model to adversarial attacks. As shown in Table IV,
we obtain for the Natural model 99.5%, 98%, 99,9% and
100% evasion rates on dFGSMs, rFGSMs, BGAs and
BCAs, respectively. We show that the four evasion attacks
on the PCA DNNs architecture are significantly increase the
evasion rate against the Natural training model. Also, the
overall accuracy increased for all five models from range
86-88% in Experiment I as shown in Table III to range 93-
93.5% in Experiment II as shown in Table V. In experiment
I, the evasion rate for BCAs is 64% while the evasion rate
in Experiment II for BCAs is 100%. We observe that the
values of CN for the BCAs in our two set of Experiments I
and II have influenced the results. The CN ratios are 1.2 and
1.0 in experiment I and II as shown in Table III and Table
V, respectively. It is worth mentioning that the CN ratio for
for the BCAs in [2] was 0.
TABLE IV: Evasion Rate Results of Experiment II with PCA
- Adversarial Attack Methods
Model dFGSM rFGSM BGA BCA
Natural 99.5 98.0 99.9 100
dFGSM 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
rFGSM 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
BGA 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9
BCA 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.6
TABLE V: Evaluation Metrics including Overall Accuracy,
Evasion rate of models about the corresponding adversary
(FNR), FPR and the Cover Number (CN)) rate for Experi-
ment II
Model Accuracy FPR Evasion Rate CN ratio
Natural 93.4 7.2 5.9 1
dFGSM 93.7 8.1 4.1 0.8
rFGSM 93.9 8.0 3.8 1.1
BGA 93.0 10.4 2.9 1
BCA 93.5 8.1 4.6 1
To summarize the overall results of Experiment II, the
evasion rates are relatively three-time lower as shown in
Table IV comparing to the evasion rates in Experiment I
as shown in Table II. We noticed that using PCA improves
the resilience of IDS models against adversarial samples.
Moreover, the results in Experiment II Table IV of the
trained models show equal robustness against all adversaries
in each method. For example, the result for BGAs with
shade cells in yellow have the lowest and almost the same
evasion rates 2.9-3% for all adversarial attack methods. Also,
dFGSMs model shows a higher resilience to adversarial
attack comparing to dFGSMs model in Experiment I. The
evasion rates reduce from 15.7-23% in Experiment I to range
of 2.9-3% as shown in Table IV in Experiment II. Another
observation is that the FNR and FPR values in Experiment
II as shown in Table V in generally lower than the FNR in
Experiment I as shown in Table III. Indeed, FNR and FPR are
reduced because the adversarial training models robustness
improve.
C. Discussion
We highlighted in our evaluation of our IDS prototype the
following aspects: Does our IDS prototype based on min-
max (or saddle-point) formulation improve the robustness
against adversarial samples generated by the inner maxi-
mization? Does the PCA reduce the evasion rate of the
studied adversarial attacks? Do adversarial attack methods
that are initially designed [2] to attack deep learning models
in discrete/binary features domain exhibit different misclas-
sification levels in continuous feature domain?
The experiments show that the robustness of our Natural
IDS model (defender) that is trained with a clean dataset
has high evasion rate of 100% against the four adversar-
ial attacks introduced in previous sections. While the IDS
models trained using min-max (or saddle-point) approach
are more robust to adversarial samples as shown in Table II
and IV among all adversaries attacks samples. By using the
inner maximizer approach, we generate adversarial samples
that maximize the evasion rate. We assess the robustness
of our models that are trained using the adversarial training
methods and we achieve low evasion rates across all the ad-
versarial attack methods. Likewise, experiment II shows that
performing PCA on our selected dataset leads to decrease the
overall evasion rates across all adversarial attack methods. In
this paper, although we have continuous feature space, we
used BGAs and BCAs in our work to generate adversarial
samples and incorporate them in the training phase. It is
interesting to note that BGAs and BCAs adversarial attack
methods [2] that have been designed to fit discrete data like
binary malware file have the highest evasion rate among all
other used adversarial attack methods.
Using different adversarial attack methods with the saddle-
point formulation in deep learning-based IDS in addition
to malware detection [2] and image classification [11] that
used also saddle-point formulation, opens a new direction
to explore general defense against more type of adversarial
attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have applied the min-max (or saddle-
point) formulation in the IDS domain and investigated the
effectiveness of the ”inner maximization problem” on the
robustness of adversarially trained model ”outer minimiza-
tion problem.” We generated adversarial samples using four
existing methods dFGSMs, rFGSMs,BGAs and BCAs.
We analyzed if BGAs and BCAs, which are designed for
discrete feature domain can generate adversarial samples
in continuous features domain. We found out that BGA
adversaries have the highest evasion rate among all other
adversaries. We also found that all other trained models are
considerably vulnerable to the BGA and BCA adversaries.
Our experiments provide evidence that DNN with min-max
(or saddle-point) formulation increases the robustness of the
experimental IDS using the UNSW-NB 15 dataset. Moreover,
we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and the ex-
periments showed that carrying out dimensionality reduction
using PCA on the dataset helped in decreasing evasion
rates. We believe that further exploration in dimensionality
reduction in the deep neural networks can lead us to further
optimization and robustness of IDS solutions.
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